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Abstract: 
Using a panel of large firms from Spain, we check the relative time persistence of different 
types of labour conflicts such as strikes, collective conflicts, lockouts and other conflicts 
with lost working hours but without the previous stated legal forms for labour conflicts. We 
present random-effects probit estimations comparing observations with each type of 
conflicts with the same set of observations without any type of conflict. The results show 
that no legal form labour conflicts do not have long-term persistence (persistence is only in 
the short-term, from quarter to quarter), and the other types of conflicts suffer short and 
long-term persistence of confliction at the firm level, corresponds to strikes the higher size 
of both types of persistence. As short and long term persistence of strikes have almost the 
same size these results do not support asymmetric information theories of strike.  
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1. Introduction 
 Many times labour relations are not easy. As in other social relationships, conflicts 
are frequent and in some cases these conflicts lead to lose working hours. Strike is the most 
extreme form of lost working hours because of labour conflicts at the workplace. The 
economic literature on strikes has focused on explaining their existence (because of the 
renown ‘Hicks paradox’) and on analyzing their duration.  
However, this literature lacks to analyze strikes in the context of the rest of labour 
conflicts at the workplace. In fact, strike is a type of conflict leading to stop (partially or 
totally) the production process, with a specific legal regulation in all Western countries. 
Even Labour Law of some countries stipulates other legal forms of labour conflicts in order 
to regulate the rights of workers and employers and, sometimes, to prevent disruptions in 
the production process and losses of working hours.  
These differences in the legal forms of labour conflicts and the possibility of losing 
working hours out from such legal forms of conflicts can be used to propose a research 
design to analyze the relevance of the legal form for labour conflict persistence at firm 
level. According to this idea, our main objective consists of analyzing whether those 
conflicts developed under a legal form (mainly strikes) are more or less persistent (more 
‘conflictive’) than those labour conflicts without such legal forms but with losses of 
working hours (i.e., creating a partial or total disruption in the production process). We will 
approach to a conflictive climate of labour relations at firm level distinguishing short and 
long term effects on the probability of each type of labour conflict. This is another novelty 
of our empirical analysis: strikes are not considered in isolation not only respect to other 
labour conflicts but we also consider the eventual impact of past strikes (or other labour 
conflicts) on the likelihood of current strikes (or other labour conflicts).  
Apart from these dynamic effects of conflicts and as a side objective, we will 
especially focus on the existence of a collective agreement at firm level or at above levels, 
and the relative relevance of atypical contracts (temporary and part-time contracts) in the 
firm. The first variable would be analyzed as a proxy of a stronger organization of workers 
at firm level respect to agreements at an above level, and temporary and part-time contracts 
will be used as proxies of the power of workers in front of their employers (assuming that 
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workers with atypical contracts will be more reluctant to be involved in any type of 
conflict, but especially in those without a explicit legal form). 
Our database is a quarterly panel of Spanish firms (in Spanish Encuesta de 
Coyuntura Laboral, for short ECL, or survey on short-term situation of employment). This 
database lets us include rich information about different conflicts at firm level, jointly with 
information on many characteristics of the firm. Although the micro-data of this database 
cover all firms’ sizes, we focus on large firms (those with 500 workers or more). For 
smaller firm’s sizes the ECL is a rotary panel (with firms remaining 8 quarters in the 
sample), but firms with 500 workers or more are interviewed all quarters. Then, for these 
large firms the survey is a sort of census of firms. Consequently, we have a longer quarterly 
panel from 1993Q1 to 2002Q1.  
The remainder of the article is as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the 
economic literature on strikes, stressing the lack of approaches considering the variety of 
labour conflicts different than strikes. Then, we present a short descriptive analysis of the 
database and the main variables of our analysis. After this description, we explain the 
econometric specification, in order to show how we estimate the persistence of labour 
conflicts distinguishing short term and long term dynamic effects. Then, we discuss the 
results of the different estimations. A conclusions section closes the article. 
  
2. Economic models of strike and labour conflicts 
Traditionally, the Economics literature on labour conflicts is very focused on 
collective bargaining and strikes.  
Collective bargaining between employers and trade unions is not always something 
easy, and sometimes the breakdown of the negotiations process happens. These 
breakdowns lead to strikes, with relevant costs for employers but also for workers. There 
are many economic models which try to find a coherent explanation for the existence of 
these breakdowns; see, for example, Kennan (1986) for a survey.  
The first attempt to understand strikes as an economic phenomenon was made by 
Hicks (1932, 1963), who assumed rational agents under symmetric and perfect information. 
Under these assumptions a paradox emerges: in such a context a strike only can be the 
result of non-rational behaviour of agents (either employers or workers), but as agents are 
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rational by assumption strikes are not possible (although they obviously exist!). Hicks tried 
to look for an explanation to this contradiction arguing that the strike situation might be 
explained because of two reasons. The first one is a wrong perception of the objectives of 
some of the agents. In other words, strike is a mistake. The second reason attributes strikes 
to the fact that sometimes employers and/or unions want to be considered as rough 
negotiators so that their threats should be credible and resisting long strikes is a way to 
show roughness. From this perspective, strike is an informational device. 
In this vein, two main research lines develop models for explaining strikes in terms 
of imperfect information and asymmetric information. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) 
present a model where strikes are the results of mistakes arising from the existence of 
incomplete information in the wage bargaining of employers and unions. These authors 
presented the first systematic economic analysis of the fluctuations of strikes and 
discovered the existence of a trade off between the rate of unemployment, the changes in 
the real wages, and the strike activity.   
On strikes and asymmetric information, the first model was proposed by Hayes 
(1984), later developed by other authors as Tracy (1987), Kennan and Wilson (1993) and 
more recently Cramton and Tracy (2003).  Departing from the Hicks’ assumptions, these 
models assume that the agents do not have perfect information on the objectives and 
strength of the other agents. Then, strike is used as an information tool. The wage 
bargaining would begin with the request by the unions of rising wages under the threat of a 
strike, as long as necessary to obtain such increase in wages. Obviously, at the beginning of 
the process, the firm does not know whether the union is tough enough to meet the threat. 
Then, strike duration can be used as an informational tool as only really tough unions can 
sustain a long strike with high costs for the firm. As the firm gives a high likelihood that the 
union is really tough, the strike will end with an agreement in line with union claims. 
However, if the firm accumulates information that the union is weak, a longer strike will 
not be really costly for the firm, because the strike will end with an agreement in line with 
firm claims (a low wage). Then, these models predict that short strikes end with relevant 
wages’ increases while long strikes do not, as empirical evidence confirms.  
Models based on asymmetric information also predict a direct relationship between 
size of the firm and strikes duration. Ingram et al. (1993) explain that in big firms with 
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many different plants it is more difficult to know the benefits of the firm and, as a 
consequence of poor information, there will be more strikes than in small firms. In the same 
vein, the volatility of firm benefits, according to Tracy (1987) and Cramton and Tracy 
(1994), is also an important variable explaining the incidence of strikes. 
The asymmetric information models also have a prediction about the persistence of 
strikes, in line with our main objective in this article. If the bargaining parties are the same 
year after year, they will learn from past mistakes and they will know much and much 
better to the other bargaining party. Therefore, as past strikes reveal information about the 
characteristics of the other bargaining party, then past strikes will decrease the likelihood of 
a current strike (or the duration of a current strike will be shorter). Ingram et al. (1993), 
Card (1988) and Jimenez-Martin et al. (1996) include a dynamic term in the equation for 
strike probability to test this prediction. Although their results are not totally conclusive, the 
empirical evidence seems to show that informational asymmetries are prone to persist (at 
least partially). 
Finally, there is a third type of strike’s theory emphasizing the costs of strikes 
known as ‘theory of joint costs’ (Kennan, 1986; and Reder and Neuman, 1980). According 
to this set of theories, when the strike’s costs for firms and unions are low, the probability 
of strike is higher. When the costs of strikes are low, firms and unions do not have 
incentives to implement protocols or bargaining attempts to avoid this type of labour 
conflicts. To test this hypothesis, Card (1990) distinguishes two different effects on the cost 
of the strike depending on the business cycle of the products and labour markets. If there is 
a very good situation in the labour market, the cost of the strike falls. However, an 
expansion in the product market increases the costs of a strike and decreases the incidence 
of strikes. Therefore, in this case the incidence of strikes is countercyclical. His results are 
in line with these predictions. 
There is also a line of research that focuses on analyzing the relevance of 
institutional factors that would be behind a more or less conflictive climate of labour 
relationships environment (mainly neglected by the above described theories), and 
therefore affecting to the incidence and duration of strikes.  
Dahrendorf (1988) as well as Siebert and Adddison (1981) emphasize that the 
extension of the strike phenomenon would be related to the degree of ‘institutionalization’ 
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of the labour conflicts through the maturity of the collective bargaining system, closely 
linked to the degree of development of trade unions and employers’ organizations. In this 
line, we can also include those studies that have analyzed whether the legal regulation of 
the strike restricts or amplifies the incidence and duration of strikes. In fact, in many 
occasions, it has been noted that regulatory lacks, for example, in the Spanish case would 
explain the higher strike incidence in this country in the 1980s. In this regard, Milner and 
Nombela (1995) conclude that the higher relative incidence of strikes in Spain in 
comparison with other similar countries is not due to a lack of legal regulation nor to a legal 
regulation more permissive than in other countries. In the same vein, Jiménez-Martín 
(2006) shows that when restricting to strikes linked to collective bargaining the strike 
incidence in Spain is rather similar to other European countries. 
Our main objective is closer to the last ‘institutional’ perspective, as we are mainly 
worried about comparing strikes with other labour conflicts with a explicit legal regulation 
(what we will call ‘a legal form’) and with other conflicts without such legal forms but with 
lost working hours. This last type of conflict could be ‘illegal’ or, at least, not explicitly 
considered by Labour Law and, therefore, they are labour conflicts with no legal form 
(NLF conflicts, for short).  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Data and main variables. 
The data for this research come from the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL).  
The ECL is a longitudinal survey carried out on a quarterly basis since the second quarter 
of 1990 by the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.  Originally, it surveyed 
establishments with more than five workers in non-agriculture industries, excluding Public 
Administration, Defense and Social Security, diplomatic delegations, and international and 
religious organizations in the service sector. In 1997, the ECL underwent an important 
methodological change involving the inclusion of establishments with less than 5 workers 
in the survey
1
 sample along with a new sample stratification methodology. 
                                                 
1 Firms with at least 1 worker are included, but self-employed workers (i.e., ‘firms’ without wage and salaried 
workers) are excluded. 
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We use data on establishments having more than 500 employees during the period 
1993Q1-2002Q1. On average, this stratum represents approximately 15 percent of non-
agriculture employment in Spain. This is the only stratum of micro data unaffected by the 
1997 changes to the survey methodology. In addition, this stratum of establishments with 
500 employees constitutes the Spanish universe of large firms and, therefore, observations 
do not need to be weighted.
2
 In particular, we have a panel consisting of 38,020 
observations during the 1/1993-1/2002 period.  
In this database there is information to distinguish different types of labour 
conflicts. 
First, strike is the most relevant labour conflict in terms of frequency. From a legal 
point of view, this type of conflict involves the temporary suspension of work done 
collectively by the workers through a previous call that must fulfil a series of legal 
requirements. These legal requirements include an advance notice of 5 days to the employer 
and to the Public Administration. The advance notice must explain the reasons for the 
strike, the objectives of the strike, a description of all previous attempts to solve the 
problems, the strike starting date and which workers are in the strike committee. When the 
strike affects to public services the advance notice extends to 10 days and Public 
Administration can state minimum mandatory levels for these services. For our analysis, 
these minimum mandatory levels could affect to the number of lost working hours in some 
key industries but not to the strikes’ incidence. 
Second, there are collective conflicts. This term refers to a legal procedure to solve 
conflicting situations affecting general interests of workers at the firm level. Formally, this 
conflict should not lead to the suspension of work tasks and therefore should not lead to lost 
working hours. Nevertheless, in fact it is not so and (in some firms) there are registered 
losses of working hours in firms where a collective conflict takes place. From a legal point 
of view, a collective conflict has two key features: the reason for the conflict which should 
be beyond the interest of an isolated worker affecting clearly to a group of workers; and the 
representation of workers should be collective, not different isolated claims by each 
affected worker. A collective conflict can be solved by labour courts if the workers’ 
                                                 
2 When a firm is occasionally below the threshold of 500 employees, it is maintained in our stratum and it is 
only eliminated when the firm does not recover the level of 500 employees during two additional quarters. 
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representative –or the employer or Public Administration if public interest is affected– files 
a suit to the tribunals. A long lasting collective conflict might be followed by a strike. 
According to the law, a non solved collective conflict is considered a valid reason for 
explaining a strike in the corresponding advance notice. 
Third, there is also the possibility of a lockout. A lockout is a defensive right of the 
employer which might be exercised if a collective labour disruption threatens the firm.  
Therefore, by definition the lockout is related with lost working hours. The legal effects of 
lockouts are the same of strikes in terms of the suspension of the labour relationship. 
However, the legal procedure for lockouts is different. The employer must communicate to 
the Public Administration the lockout within 12 hours and only is legal when it is the 
answer to previous strike or to a clear generalized disruption in the production process in 
the firm (especially if violence is involved). Therefore, lockouts are limited to urgent 
answers to very exceptional situations (and, consequently, their incidence is much lower). 
Finally, we have in the survey a different variable on lost working hours because of 
labour conflict (in general). We have checked that there are losses of working hours in the 
three above legal forms of labour conflicts (although in many cases of collective conflicts 
there are not any impact in working hours). However, there are firms where there are not 
any of the legal forms of labour conflicts but there are computed losses of working hours 
because of labour conflicts. We interpret these cases as labour conflicts with no legal form 
(for short, NLF labour conflicts). 
The incidence of each type of conflict can be analyzed with the information 
provided in the ECL. Consequently, we will raise in the econometric study four different 
dependent variables: strikes, collective conflicts, lockouts, and NLF labour conflicts.  
In order to have a sound empirical analysis, it is important to define the comparison 
group of those firms with conflicts (of any type). Notice that the four main variables of 
conflict could be defined as dummies according to the following rule: 0 for no that type of 
conflict, 1 for the existence of that type of conflict. However, this definition would provide 
a different comparison group for each conflict variable (i.e. different groups of firms with 
‘zeros’ for each conflict type). For example, those firms without a collective conflict could 
have suffered a strike or a NLF labour conflict. To have a more meaningful empirical 
analysis we have chosen to define a common comparison group for all conflicts cases: 
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those firms with any type of conflict at all (in the same quarter). Therefore, for the 4 
dichotomous dependent variables on labour conflicts, observations with ‘zeros’ are the 
same for the four dummy variables on labour conflicts, but ‘ones’ are different and 
correspond to observations registering each type of conflict
3
. 
Table 1 shows the main characteristics
4
 of firms and their workers in those with 
each type of conflict and in those without conflicts
5
. On average, the incidence of conflicts 
is not really high, although the highest rate is 7.3% for strikes. Anyway, this figure is in line 
(and even slightly lower) with those provided in other studies, as in Jiménez-Martin et al. 
(1996; Table 1). The rarest conflict is the collective conflict (0.4%) while lockout and NLF 
labour conflicts affects around 2% of observations. 
Focusing on workers’ and firms’ characteristics, there are relevant differences 
between firms with and without labour conflicts. In firms with conflicts, the average size is 
higher and the prevalence of a collective agreement at firm level
6
 is really much higher. On 
workers characteristics, in firms with conflicts the shares of part-time and temporary 
workers are lower than in non-conflict firms. In other words, when workers are organized 
(i.e., there is a collective agreement at firm level) there are more labour conflicts with lost 
working hours and when there are more workers with ‘less power’ in front of their 
employer (i.e., the higher the share of different atypical contracts) there are less labour 
conflicts. In the same vein, the percentage of firms without collective agreement at firm 
level is lower in those without conflicts, with the exception of firms with NLF labour 
conflicts. Collective agreement at firm level is a proxy of a high level of organization of 
                                                 
3 As a result of this definition of conflict variables we will have a sample size in probits below 38,020. 
Because of our definition of the no conflict comparison group, we lost those observations with 0 in a specific 
type of conflict but 1 in a different type of conflict. But, as we explain above, the comparison group is always  
the same for all types of labour conflicts. Table A2 in the Appendix presents means for all variables for the 
zeros subsamples in each probit and the differences are negligible. 
4 For a description of all variables see Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix. 
5 The column for no conflicts at all corresponds strictly to the estimation of the probit model for strikes. As 
we said before, Table A2 shows the description of all variables for the zeros of the 4 dependent variables of 
labour conflicts. Although there are missing cases because the lags of the different dependent variables affect 
to different cases the means are almost the same for all variables for the comparison group in the all 
subsamples. 
6 The variable for collective agreement at firm level is defined as a dummy variable. The reference group (no 
collective agreement at firm level) corresponds to collective agreements at above levels (industry, province, 
regional or national). In Spain, there is not a ‘free’ labour market, and in fact all workers are covered by a 
collective agreement, and the only difference is the level of this agreement. Only very special cases are out 
from collective agreements at any level (as managers). On more details on collective agreements at firm level 
and above levels in Spain, see, for example, García-Serrano and Malo (2002 and 2009) or Canal and 
Rodríguez, 2004).  
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workers at the workplace (García-Serrano and Malo, 2002 and 2009) and -at descriptive 
level- the figures in Table 1 are consistent with more conflicts in firms where workers are 
organized to exert pressure on the firm. However, this descriptive evidence shows an 
interesting complementary feature: NLF labour conflicts are not correlated with the 
existence of a collective agreement at firm level (i.e. organization of the workers at the 
workplace) but with the opposite. 
Concerning industries, strikes, lockouts and no conflicts are mainly concentrated 
(around 70%) in three industries: traditional services, services for the firms, and social 
services. In addition, for strikes equipment manufacturing is also relevant (10.5%). NLF 
labour conflicts have a similar pattern, but focusing on social services (43.3%), services for 
firms (21.6%) and equipment manufacturing (15.6%). Collective conflicts are markedly 
different, as energy, water and extractive industries, metal processing and equipment 
manufacturing add more than 60% of all conflicts of this type (although social services is 
also relevant, adding 16.8% of this type of labour conflict).   
Finally, Figure 1 shows a first (descriptive) approach to the persistence of each type 
of labour conflict (including no conflict at all). The distribution of observations with at least 
one quarter registering a conflict
7
 (or no conflict at all) shows that few conflicts are the 
most common situations. The smoothest decreasing pattern among conflict variables 
correspond to strikes, which means that it is the most common type of conflict along time. 
Any way, beyond 8 quarters with strikes the percentages are rather close to zero (while for 
the other types of conflict for 4 to 6 onwards). As complementary information, we show the 
distribution of firms with any type of conflict. Notice that for 1 quarter the percentage of no 
conflict is below 10% and the decreasing pattern is much smoother than for conflicts series.  
Although this only a descriptive approach, Figure 1 allows to presume that time persistence 
is likely more important for strikes than for any other type of conflict, even NLF labour 
conflicts. Anyway short-term persistence could also exist for labour conflicts other than 
strikes. The econometric analysis will help us to distinguish the relative relevance of short-
term and long-term persistence of each type of conflict. 
 
                                                 
7 Notice that Figure 1 shows quarters registering a labour conflict not conflicts lasting 2, 3, etc. consecutive 
quarters. For example, when a firm has 10 quarters with strikes, they can be of a few hours in the quarter and 
in not necessarily consecutive quarters from 1993 to 2002. 
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3.2. Econometric specification 
Past labour conflicts in the firm probably affects to the likelihood of a current labour 
conflict. This is what we call ‘persistence’ of conflicts. Therefore, in the analysis of the 
persistence of labour disputes is essential to tackle the econometric problem known as 
‘initial conditions’. In our context, initial conditions mean that the probability of having a 
conflict in the firm at time t not only will be affected by whether or not it has had one in t-1 
but also by the possibility that it has had a conflict at the very beginning of the considered 
period. The econometric literature has been facing this issue for a long time to and in 
several ways in rather different economic problems (as in the probability of being poor, for 
example). Recently, Wooldridge (2005) proposed a relatively simple econometric 
specification, modeling the distribution of the conditional unobserved effect at the initial 
value along with any exogenous explanatory variable. For certain non-linear models 
(among them the dynamic probit model for random effects) Wooldridge’s proposal permits 
a simple estimation by means of the most commonly used statistical software. 
 In our database, we have 37 quarters in total. We will assume that the observations 
in the first point in time correspond to the initial conditions of our model and, therefore, we 
will refer to them as moment 0. Hence the model will cover the periods 1 to 36, which 
correspond to the quarters 2 to 37 of our database. Each firm in each quarter may or not 
may have a labour conflict. If the firm does not register a conflict this variable has the value 
0, otherwise the variable has the value 1. This is our dependent variable whose probability 
of occurrence we want to explain. 
Thus, for a firm i the conditional probability of having a labour conflict with lost 
working hours will be: 
),,,|1( 11 iitiitit cxzyyP                                                                                             (1) 
 Where yit is the existence of a labour conflict in the firm i at time t, zi includes 
variables which can change from firm to firm but which do not change over time (such as 
industry), yit-1 is the value of the dependent variable in the previous period and is included 
to take into account the effect of the state dependence, xit-1 includes variables affecting the 
probability of having a labour conflict and can change from firm to firm and over time, and 
ci denotes the specific individual effect of each firm. The variables that change between 
firms and over time include a lag to avoid problems of endogeneity. 
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We parametrize the individual effect as follows
8
: 
iiii yxc   00                                                                                                         (2) 
Here, we are assuming that the individual effect is related to the initial conditions of 
conflict and the explanation variables, with the addition of an unobserved individual effect 
μi which, it is a probit of random effects, will be distributed according to a normal 
distribution N(0,σ2). 
The final specification of the random effects probit model is as follows: 
itiiiitiitiiitiitit yxxzyyxxzyyP    00110011 ),,,,|1(         (3) 
where the parameters being estimated are α, γ, β, π, and δ.  
 In order to have an easier interpretation of the results, we should take into account 
how the variables that change between firms and over time affect the probability of labour 
conflict in each quarter. These variables (included in the set of variables denoted by x) have 
two different effects on the probability of recording a conflict. On one hand, we have the 
short-term effect on the probability of conflict thanks to the estimated coefficient , while 
the long-term effect is obtained by the estimated coefficient 
ˆ
ˆ because this is the effect of 
the initial condition of each variable or, in other words, the persistent effect of this variable 
on the probability of having a labour conflict. Thus, we have the linkage between 
unobserved heterogeneity and the initial condition of this variable. Similarly, the 
coefficients ˆ  and  provide us with the short and long-term effect of for past labour 
conflicts on the probability of having a conflict in the present. Specifically, the 
coefficient
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
, if it is strictly positive picks up the effect of true state dependence, and the 
coefficient shows the impact of the relations between the unobserved heterogeneity 
between firms and the level of confliction at the initial moment. 

Finally, the individual heterogeneity that does not change over time is picked up by 
μi. In a random effects probit estimation this effect is measured by an intra-class correlation 
coefficient, usually denoted as ρ. This coefficient gives the quantity of the unexplained 
variance (conditional on the observed variables) which is attributed to the individual effect. 
                                                 
8 The same parametrization is used by other authors in different contexts, as Hernández-Quevedo et al., 
(2008) for a problem of the persistence of health conditions. 
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The estimation of the variance, σ2, indicates the dispersion of the unobserved heterogeneity. 
Hence this information is also included in the table with the econometric estimations.  
 
3.3. Econometric results. 
We estimate a random effects probit for each definition of labour conflict with lost 
working hours described in previous sections. We have two groups of independent 
variables. The first one (zi) is composed by the following variables not varying on time: 
industry and region. Both are defined as sets of dummies. The second group (xit-1) 
corresponds to the variables changing on time and includes the existence of a collective 
agreement at firm level, the proportion of temporary workers, the proportion of full-time 
workers, the size of the firm (as a set of 3 dummies), and the quarterly growth rate of the 
GDP
9
.The results shown in Table 2 are in terms of the marginal effects of variables
10
 in 
order to have an easier interpretation. 
To test the relevance of the legal form of the conflict we begin comparing the 
second row of all types of labour conflict. Why? This row includes the coefficients of the 
initial conditions of the corresponding dependent variable of labour conflict. Therefore, a 
positive coefficient means that conflicts in the far past are affecting to the likelihood of 
current conflicts. If the legal form helps to decrease this long-term ‘unrest’ in the labour 
relations at the firm level, this long-term effect will be lower for those forms of conflict 
with a legal form. Here, these forms of labour conflict are strikes, lockouts and collective 
conflict, as opposed to NLF labour conflicts (last column of Table 2). 
For all types of conflicts there are relevant long-term effects with the exception of 
NLF labour conflicts: for strikes the long-term impact is an increase of 9.7 percentage 
points (pp), for collective conflicts is 3.8% and for lockouts 3.9 pp, while for NLF labour 
conflicts is not statistically significant
11
. Therefore, NLF conflicts are not presumably 
related with a confliction labour relationship at a firm level, but with specific not long-
lasting problems. Therefore, the legal form of a labour conflict is not associated with a 
lower confliction at firm level, but the opposite. Is the legal regulation behind this long-
                                                 
9 As we explained in previous sections, according to Card (1990) and McCollen (1990) the GDP growth rate 
provides a test for the joint costs theory of strikes. 
10 The estimated coefficients for all probit models are available upon request. 
11 And anyway the estimated marginal effect is rather close to zero (0.2 pp). 
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term persistence of legal labour conflicts or harder conflicts are those taking the form of 
strikes, collective conflicts or lockouts? Our estimation can not allow us to give a definitive 
answer to this question, but as we have a dynamic model, we can conclude that the legal 
regulation of labour conflicts does not provide an effective framework to decrease long-
term confliction, especially in the case of strikes (even considering that strikes might be the 
channel for the hardest labour conflicts).  
The first row presents the short-term effect of each type of conflict, i.e., the impact 
of having a conflict in the previous quarter (not in the far past) on the likelihood to suffer 
the same conflict in the current quarter. The largest short-term effect is for strikes which 
reached 7.2 pp, as compared to 1.3 pp in the case of collective conflicts, 4.6 pp for lockouts 
and around 2 pp in case of NLF labour conflicts. We want to remark that for strikes and 
collective conflicts the size of the long-term effect is above the short-term effect (which is 
represented in the first row (the corresponding lagged dependent variable of labour 
conflict): 9.7 pp and 3.8 pp in front of 7.2 pp and 1.3 for strikes and collective conflicts 
respectively. 
Another interesting feature of the Wooldridge (2005) proposal in our context is that 
lagged values of the dependent variable provide a test of the asymmetric information 
theories of strike. According to these theories, at least in the case of strikes, the long-term 
effect should be zero, as all relevant information should be disclosed in the long-term, 
while in the short-term a positive impact should be observed as a strike in the previous 
quarter could increase new information about the counterpart in labour relationships.  
We explained above that all conflicts considered in Table 2 have relevant time 
inertia in the short and also in the long-term, including strikes (with the key exception of 
NLF labour conflicts, with only short-term inertia). Therefore, if there are information 
asymmetries they persist for all types of labour conflicts and for the strikes in a very clear 
way (i.e., with the highest long-term impact on the probability of a conflict in the current 
quarter.)
12
 This is exactly the opposite of the predictions of asymmetric information 
                                                 
12 A similar result for Spain was found by Jiménez-Martín et al. (1996), but with results of other variables 
according to the asymmetric information models (variables not included in our database such as wage claims 
in collective bargaining). The econometric specification used by Jiménez et al. (1996) to avoid the problem of 
incidental parameters was a linear probability model (one of the best specification options before Wooldridge, 
2005). 
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theories. Only for NLF labour conflicts, an interpretation in terms of asymmetric 
information theories would be consistent with the results
13
. 
Nevertheless, we might obtain a partial support for asymmetric information theories 
if at least the relative size of the short-term effect would be larger that the long-term effect. 
By contrast, the short and long-term effects of strikes are virtually identical (an increase 
around 9 pp), while the short-term effect is even a bit lower than the long-term effect. The 
results are similar for collective conflicts, while for lockouts the short-term effect is slightly 
above the long-term effect. Therefore, only for lockouts there would be any sort of decrease 
in asymmetric information (if we assimilate that these conflicts might also be used as 
informative means about the other agents). Concerning strikes, in terms of the theory of 
asymmetric information there is no learning over time as the influence of recent and very 
past strikes are rather the same and, therefore, information asymmetries would persist, 
which is additional evidence against asymmetric information theories on strike
14
.  
  
3.4. Other variables 
We will now comment the results of the rest of variables included in the 
estimations, beginning with the existence of an agreement and the structure of the staff. 
The existence of a collective agreement at firm level is only clearly relevant for the 
likelihood of strike: the short-term effect is rather low an increase of below 1 pp and the 
long-term effect is 2.4 pp. These results are coherent with collective agreements at firm 
level as indicators of a relevant level of workers’ organization at the workplace to protect 
their interests (García-Serrano and Malo, 2002 and 2009; Canal and Rodríguez, 2004). If 
workers are effectively organized at the workplace (even as to sign a collective agreement 
with the employer), the workers’ costs for organizing themselves for a strike are lower and, 
then, the likelihood of strike will be higher. However, for the rest of conflicts the same 
interpretation is only valid in the long-term for NLF conflicts, but with a very small effect 
(an increase of 0.5 pp). When there is a collective agreement at the firm level there is also 
an increase of the likelihood of a lockout in the short-term, but this effect is also rather 
small (an increase of 0.6 pp). Therefore, in fact, the interpretation that a better organization 
                                                 
13 Although, we want to remark that these theories only consider the case of strikes and not other types of 
labour conflicts. 
14 And the same would be applicable to collective conflicts, considering this type of labour conflict as a way 
to obtain information on the other economic agents. 
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of workers at the firm-level is related with a more conflictive climate of labour relations at 
the workplace has only a relevant size for strikes in the long term. 
Regarding the workforce structure, the percentage of full-time workers and the 
percentage of temporary workers have been included in the initial moment and in t-1, to 
check whether workers with ‘atypical’ contracts are weaker and, then, the likelihood of 
conflict is lower. An increase of 1 point of the proportion of full-time workers in the 
previous quarter increases the probability of strike in the current quarter in 7 pp, while there 
is not a long-term significant effect of this variable. However, there is a negative long-term 
effect of the proportion of full-time workers on the probability of collective conflict (-0.1 
pp) and NLF conflict (-1.3 pp). On the other hand, an increase of 1 point in the percentage 
of temporary workers in the previous quarter increases the probability of strike in 1.9 pp in 
the current worker, with a negative long-term effect of 3.3 pp. For the rest of labour 
conflicts, only there is a significant negative long-term effect of the percentage of 
temporary workers on the probability of collective conflicts (although it is rather close to 
zero, almost 0.1 pp). 
Therefore, we only obtain very limited empirical support to the theoretical link 
between a greater relevance of atypical contracts and weakness of workers at the workplace 
to sustain an open conflict with the employer. Even for the lockout (an answer of the 
employer to a labour conflict) we do not find any support at all. Only for strikes the results 
are coherent with such interpretation, with the main (and relevant) exception of the positive 
effect of the one-lagged percentage of temporary workers on the probability of strike in the 
current quarter. 
With respect to the characteristics of the firm we have size and industry.  
As for the size of firms, the results show that all firms below 1500 workers at the 
initial moment are less likely to suffer strikes. This result would be in line with the theory 
of asymmetric information, as in smaller firms (always considering that we only have firms 
with 500 or more workers) unions will have better information about the firm and strikes 
are not so used as informational devices. There are similar results, but in the short-term for 
lockouts and NLF labour conflicts (only for those firms between 500 and 700 workers). 
However, the support of an interpretation following asymmetric information theories is 
limited, as we also obtain a positive short-term effect for firms between 500 and 700 
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workers for the case of strikes. Then, the empirical evidence is not really conclusive about 
the relationship between firm’s size and asymmetric information theory. Nevertheless, we 
have also to remark that we only have firms with 500 or more workers, i.e. firms that 
usually are considered all of them as ‘large’. 
On industries, there is not huge differences respect to the construction sector (which 
is the reference). Anyway, the significant differences are always negative respect to the 
reference industry. For the case of strikes, metal processing and the residual group of 
manufacturing industries have a likelihood of conflict around 1.6 pp lower, while for 
sanitation services is 2.5 pp lower. For collective conflicts, there are no significant 
differences by industry. For lockouts, metal processing, equipment manufacturing, other 
manufacturing industries, personal services and sanitation services, decreases each of them 
the probability of lockout in around 0.5 pp. Finally, for NLF labour conflicts, metal 
processing, the residual group of manufacturing industries and traditional services, 
decreases the probability of conflict in around 0.3 pp. Therefore, metal processing and 
manufacturing industries are industries relatively less conflictive. 
We have two economic context variables: the region in which the firm is located 
and the rate of GDP growth. 
On regions, the results show that the reference region consisting of Castilla-León 
and Castilla-La Mancha (located at the centre of Spain) is the most conflictive one because 
the rest of regions with statistically significant coefficients have a negative impact on the 
probability of conflict (with only one exception in the case of NLF conflicts). In this regard, 
Madrid and the Islands are the least conflictive regions considering strikes and lockouts. 
For NLF conflicts the North-East region has a positive effect on the probability of this type 
of conflicts (an increase of 1.1 pp). For collective conflicts, there are no significant 
differences among regions. 
About the GDP growth rate (with a short-term and a long-term effect), the results 
show a countercyclical impact in the short-term for all types of conflict, with the exception 
of NLF conflicts (where it is pro-cyclical). Anyway, apart of the case of strikes, the size of 
all these effects is rather low (close to zero pp and only 0.2 pp as much for NLF conflicts). 
For strikes, the impact of an increase of 1 pp in the GDP growth rate of the previous quarter 
increases the likelihood of strike in 2 pp. A counter-cyclical long-term effect of the GDP 
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growth rate also exists for strikes, but the size of this effect is almost negligible. A pro-
cyclical long-term effect on lockout probability is also found (but rather low, 0.1 pp). The 
previous international literature (Kennan, 1986) shows an empirical regularity, pointing out 
that the strike incidence is procyclical and the strike duration is countercyclical. Therefore, 
our results are not strictly coincident with this literature. However, in the case of Spain, 
Jiménez-Martín et al. (1996) found that the effect of the unemployment rate on the 
probability of a strike is positive, which is according to our results (because a higher rate of 
unemployment is associated with a lower rate of GDP). Following Card (1990) in economic 
expansions the cost strikes increases (for the firm) and decreases the probability of strike, 
which is consistent with the theory of joint costs. 
  
4. Conclusions 
In this article, we have used a large firms’ quarterly panel from Spain (1993Q1-
2002Q1) to analyze the time persistence of labour conflicts at firm level. Because of the 
characteristics of this database we can compare different types of labour conflicts respect a 
group of observations without any type of conflict at all. In addition, we have three 
different types of labour conflicts according to Spanish Labour Law (strikes, collective 
conflicts and lockouts), plus additional situations with lost working hours at firm level but 
without any of the three legal forms of labour conflicts considered (which we have named 
as NLF conflicts, no legal form conflicts). 
Therefore, we can check labour conflicts with a stated legal form (mainly strikes) 
have higher or lower time persistence than NLF labour conflicts, which is a test about the 
capacity of legal regulation to affect to confliction of labour relationships in firm. As the 
probability of labour conflicts can be not only affected by different characteristics of the 
firms and workers but also by past conflicts in the firm, we estimate random-effects probit 
models following Wooldridge (2005). The econometric specification proposed by 
Wooldridge (2005) allows including lagged and initial conditions values of different 
variables (included the dependent variable of labour conflict) in order to separate the effects 
of short-term time persistence (from quarter to quarter) and long-term time persistence (i.e. 
the impact of conflicts held at the first observed quarter of the database, capturing the past 
‘history’ of the firm).  
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We obtain two main relevant results about time persistence of conflicts. 
First, NLF labour conflicts do not have long-term persistence, and their time 
persistence is only in the short-term (from the previous quarter to the current quarter). 
However, the three types of ‘legal’ labour conflicts suffer both, short and long-term 
persistence of confliction at the firm level. Strikes present the higher levels of persistence in 
both terms. Therefore, legal regulation does not provide an accurate channel to reduce 
confliction effectively in labour relationships, in special for strikes. It is possible to argue 
that our results do not exclude a selection of harder conflicts between types, selecting 
towards the ‘legal’ forms -and especially to strikes- those problems very difficult to solve. 
Even in this case, the results can be interpreted as the non-existence of an effective legal 
way to solve conflicts decreasing long-term confliction at the firm level. 
Second, according to asymmetric information theories of strike, they are used as 
informational devices. Then, these theories would predict that successive strikes would 
inform workers and firms about the characteristics of the other economic agent, and the 
short-term effect would be smaller than the long-term effect. Such result would mean a 
decrease in informational asymmetries thanks to past strikes. As both effects are rather 
similar (even a bit larger the long-term effect), our results do not support at all predictions 
of asymmetric information theories. 
As a side objective, we have checked how the ‘power’ of workers affects to the 
event of a labour conflict in the short and in the long-term. We have used as proxies the 
existence of a collective agreement at the firm level and the relative share of atypical 
contracts in the working staff. The first one measures the level of organization of workers at 
the firm level, because in firms where workers are effectively organized to bargain a 
collective agreement with their employer workers can exert more pressure and organize a 
labour conflict against their employer with lower costs. Concerning atypical contracts 
(here, temporary and part-time contracts), the hypothesis is that a higher percentage of this 
contracts in the stock of workers of the firm will decrease the probability of a ‘legal’ labour 
conflict, as their instability and lower attachment to the firm would decrease their 
motivation to be involved in a labour conflict. Only for strikes, the existence of agreements 
at firm level increases in the short and in the long run the likelihood of conflict, confirming 
that this level of organization of workers is relevant to understand the persistence of a 
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conflictive climate of labour relationships at the firm level. However, atypical contracts do 
not have a relevant impact on conflicts, with the exception of strikes, where they have a no 
totally coherent picture with the hypothesis explained above (as a higher percentage of 
temporary workers increases in the short-term the likelihood of a strike). 
Therefore, our results provides new and rich empirical evidence about labour 
conflicts going beyond the usual borders of strikes analyses, and providing a first approach 
to the relevance of the legal form of different types of conflicts. These new evidence opens 
the door to further research about the role of legal regulation on the persistence of labour 
relations conflicts in firms. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of main variables by conflict type 
 Strike S.E. Coll.Conflict S.E. Lockout S.E. NLF Conflict S.E. No Conflict S.E. 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
Conflict variable 0,0730  0,0042  0,0201  0,0243    
Firm Size 1574 2101 2042 2128 1769 1917 1960 2820 1253 1408
Full Time Workers Rate 0,9511 0,1164 0,9663 0,0839 0,9532 0,1163 0,9052 0,1090 0,9202 0,1592
Temp. Workers Rate 0,1905 0,2551 0,1398 0,1955 0,2427 0,3255 0,3432 0,2168 0,2524 0,2959
Building 0,0245  0,0099  0,0171  0,0141  0,0178  
Energy, water & extr. ind.  0,0640  0,1683  0,0588  0,0219  0,0392  
Metal processing 0,0786  0,1287  0,0342  0,0313  0,0708  
Equipment manufacturing 0,1054  0,3366  0,0702  0,1563  0,0869  
Other manuf. Industries 0,0494  0,0495  0,0171  0,0266  0,0655  
Traditional services 0,2234  0,0396  0,2030  0,0703  0,1675  
Services for the firms 0,2098  0,0990  0,1689  0,2156  0,2600  
Social Services 0,2258  0,1683  0,4231  0,4328  0,2577  
Personal services 0,0132  0,0000  0,0057  0,0094  0,0200  
Sanitation services 0,0061  0,0000  0,0019  0,0219  0,0146  
Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0,6044  0,7822  0,4478  0,1953  0,3777  
N observations 2714  170  711  925  25070  
Note: Labour conflict variables are not mutually exclusive, but ‘No conflicts’ category does not include any 
observation with any type of conflict. 
Source: ECL 1993Q1-2002Q1
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Table 2. Marginal Effects of random-effects probit models on the likelihood of labour 
conflict. 
Variable  Strike Sig. Collective Confl. Sig. Lockout Sig. NLF Confl. Sig 
Lag_Conflict 0,07201 *** 0,01336 *** 0,04598 *** 0,01965 *** 
IC_Conflict 0,09736 *** 0,03821 *** 0,03936 * 0,00223  
lag_Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0,00626 * 0,00014  0,00561 *** 0,00026  
IC_Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0,02373 *** 0,00005  0,00200  0,00480 *** 
lag_Temp.Workers 0,01917 *** 0,00024  0,00036  0,00266  
IC_Temp.Workers -0,03276 *** -0,00073 *** -0,00268  0,00140  
lag_Full Time 0,06761 *** 0,00033  0,00684  0,00231  
IC_Full Time -0,01295  -0,00111 ** -0,00628  -0,01283 *** 
lag_Firm Size (701-1500 workers) 0,00549  -0,00005  -0,00411 *** -0,00039  
IC_Firm Size (701-1500 workers) -0,01222 ** -0,00002  0,00054  -0,00229  
lag_Firm Size (<701 workers) 0,01204 ** 0,00004  -0,00496 *** -0,00313 ** 
IC_Firm Size (<701 workers) -0,02481 *** -0,00013  -0,00033  -0,00259  
lag_GDP growth -0,02030 *** -0,00007 *** -0,00078 *** 0,00151 *** 
ic_GDP growth -0,00034 * -0,00001  0,00135 *** 0,00016  
Region: North -0,00843  0,00005  -0,00132  0,00357  
Region: Madrid -0,02326 *** -0,00004  -0,00602 *** -0,00062  
Region: East Coast -0,01904 *** 0,00004  -0,00399 *** -0,00251  
Region: Andalusia&Extremadura -0,01066 * -0,00009  -0,00257 * 0,00343  
Region:North-East (Rioja, Navarra, Aragon) -0,00750  0,00004  -0,00369 *** 0,01153 *** 
Region: Balearic and Canary Islands -0,02290 *** -0,00012  -0,00497 *** 0,00028  
Energy, water, and extractive industries -0,01566  -0,00009  -0,00273  -0,00262  
Metal processing -0,01584 * 0,00000  -0,00487 ** -0,00382 ** 
Equipment manufacturing -0,01524  0,00018  -0,00408 * -0,00022  
Other manufacturing industries -0,01767 ** -0,00010  -0,00541 *** -0,00293 * 
Traditional services 0,00154  -0,00020  -0,00304  -0,00385 ** 
Services for the firms -0,00658  -0,00017  -0,00301  0,00019  
Social Services 0,00742  -0,00007  0,00327  0,00089  
Personal services -0,00824  -0,00019  -0,00480 ** -0,00284  
Sanitation services -0,02528 *** -0,00017  -0,00508 * 0,00368  
Pr(conflict=1| u_i=0) 0,03241  0,00013  0,00518  0,00440  
Sigma_u 0,51296  0,61739  0,56403  0,70550  
(s.e.) 0,02474  0,12577  0,04895  0,04655  
rho 0,20831  0,27597  0,21347  0,33232  
(s.e.) 0,01591  0,08141  0,03178  0,02928  
N observations 27784  24390  25120  25344  
N groups 1825  1817  1830  1825  
IC: Initial Conditions (i.e., values at the first wave). See main text for detailed explanations on initial 
conditions variables. 
Marginal effects for dummy variables correspond to a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
Source: ECL 1993Q1-2002Q1 
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Figure 1. Distribution of labour conflicts by number of quarters with conflicts (by conflict type). Note: ‘No Conflict’ means any type 
of conflict at all. Source: ECL 1993Q1-2002Q1 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of all variables for the subsamples of observations with 
labour conflicts by type and no labour conflicts at all. 
 Strike S.E. Coll.Conflict S.E. Lockout S.E. NLF Conflict S.E. No Conflict S.E. 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
         
Conflict variable 0,0730  0,0042  0,0201  0,0243    
lag_Conflict variable 0,3744  0,3168  0,2846  0,3078    
IC_Conflict variable 0,2051  0,1089  0,0209  0,5625    
lag_Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0,6011  0,7525  0,4896  0,3359  0,3754  
IC_Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0,6270  0,7723  0,4744  0,4172  0,4009  
Lag_Temp.Workers Rate 0,1885 0,2614 0,1313 0,2023 0,2389 0,3243 0,3403 0,2848 0,2543 0,2953
IC_Temp.Workers Rate 0,1772 0,2555 0,1074 0,1237 0,2303 0,3169 0,3321 0,3173 0,2665 0,2766
Lag_Full Time Workers Rate 0,9544 0,1146 0,9663 0,0919 0,9524 0,1182 0,9101 0,1355 0,9209 0,1581
IC_Full Time Workers Rate 0,9592 0,0998 0,9657 0,0962 0,9563 0,1195 0,9193 0,1380 0,9358 0,1279
lag_Firm Size (701-1500 w.) 0,4661  0,3465  0,4345  0,4844  0,4649  
IC_Firm Size (701-1500 w.) 0,5000  0,4059  0,4307  0,3734  0,4356  
lag_Firm Size (<701 w.) 0,2907  0,2772  0,2391  0,1875  0,3369  
IC_Firm Size (<701 w.) 0,2587  0,2079  0,2827  0,3359  0,3915  
lag_GDP Growth Rate 2,369 1,524 3,112 1,815 3,473 1,497 3,756 1,144 3,341 1,242
ic_GDP Growth Rate -1,013 2,521 -0,979 2,698 1,512 2,932 0,706 3,099 -0,182 2,967
Region: Center (w/o Madrid) 0,1021  0,0693  0,1233  0,0313  0,0612  
Region: North 0,1632  0,2970  0,1841  0,1125  0,1100  
Region: Madrid 0,1867  0,1584  0,1461  0,1859  0,2579  
Region: East Coast (Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia) 0,1961  0,2277  0,2144  0,1516  0,2446  
Region: South-West (Andalusia, Extremadura) 0,1980  0,1188  0,2372  0,2188  0,1746  
Region:North-East (Rioja, Navarra, Aragon) 0,1167  0,1188  0,0645  0,2578  0,0890  
Region: Balearic and Canary Islands 0,0372  0,0099  0,0304  0,0422  0,0628  
Firm Size 1574 2101 2042 2128 1769 1917 1960 2820 1253 1408
Full Time Workers Rate 0,9511 0,1164 0,9663 0,0839 0,9532 0,1163 0,9052 0,1090 0,9202 0,1592
Temp. Workers Rate 0,1905 0,2551 0,1398 0,1955 0,2427 0,3255 0,3432 0,2168 0,2524 0,2959
Building 0,0245  0,0099  0,0171  0,0141  0,0178  
Energy, water & extr. ind.  0,0640  0,1683  0,0588  0,0219  0,0392  
Metal processing 0,0786  0,1287  0,0342  0,0313  0,0708  
Equipment manufacturing 0,1054  0,3366  0,0702  0,1563  0,0869  
Other manuf. industries 0,0494  0,0495  0,0171  0,0266  0,0655  
Traditional services 0,2234  0,0396  0,2030  0,0703  0,1675  
Services for the firms 0,2098  0,0990  0,1689  0,2156  0,2600  
Social Services 0,2258  0,1683  0,4231  0,4328  0,2577  
Personal services 0,0132  0,0000  0,0057  0,0094  0,0200  
Sanitation services 0,0061  0,0000  0,0019  0,0219  0,0146  
Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0,6044  0,7822  0,4478  0,1953  0,3777  
N observations 2714  170  711  925  25070  
 27
 28
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics of all variables for the subsamples of observations 
without any type of conflict in each random-effects probit model. 
 
 Strikes=0 Coll.Conflict=0 Lockout=0 NFL Conflict=0 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
lag_Dep.Variable 0.0563  0.0031  0.0155  0.0199  
IC_Dep.Variable 0.0443  0.0011  0.0021  0.4001  
lag_Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0.3754  0.3667  0.3657  0.3644  
IC_Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0.4009  0.3922  0.3917  0.3915  
Lag_Temp.Workers Rate 0.2543 0.2953 0.2567 0.2974 0.2575 0.2984 0.2588 0.2964
IC_Temp.Workers Rate 0.2665 0.2766 0.2701 0.2769 0.2705 0.2779 0.2715 0.2776
Lag_Full Time Workers Rate 0.9209 0.1581 0.9190 0.1603 0.9193 0.1598 0.9186 0.1596
IC_Full Time Workers Rate 0.9358 0.1279 0.9342 0.1297 0.9344 0.1295 0.9339 0.1297
lag_Firm Size (701-1500 w.) 0.4649  0.4647  0.4641  0.4650  
IC_Firm Size (701-1500 w.) 0.4356  0.4327  0.4322  0.4323  
lag_Firm Size (<701 w.) 0.3369  0.3386  0.3381  0.3366  
IC_Firm Size (<701 w.) 0.3915  0.3971  0.3968  0.3965  
lag_GDP Growth Rate 3.341% 1.242 3.375% 1.233 3.374% 1.238 3.381% 1.232
ic_GDP Growth Rate -0.182% 2.967 -0.130% 2.982 -0.102% 2.990 -0.110% 2.988
Region: Center (w/o Madrid) 0.0612  0.0601  0.0610  0.0597  
Region: North 0.1100  0.1080  0.1084  0.1083  
Region: Madrid 0.2579  0.2610  0.2597  0.2601  
Region: East Coast (Catalonia, Valencia, 
Murcia) 0.2446  0.2465  0.2464  0.2444  
Region: South-West (Andalusia, 
Extremadura) 0.1746  0.1735  0.1742  0.1747  
Region:North-East (Rioja, Navarra, 
Aragon) 0.0890  0.0877  0.0873  0.0895  
Region: Balearic and Canary Islands 0.0628  0.0633  0.0631  0.0632  
Firm Size 1253 1408 1243 1380 1248 1384 1247 1386
Full Time Workers Rate 0.9202 0.1592 0.9181 0.1614 0.9184 0.1609 0.9176 0.1615
Temp. Workers Rate 0.2524 0.2959 0.2546 0.2971 0.2552 0.2980 0.2563 0.2976
Building 0.0178  0.0177  0.0181  0.0179  
Energy, water & extr. ind.  0.0392  0.0387  0.0385  0.0380  
Metal processing 0.0708  0.0703  0.0697  0.0695  
Equipment manufacturing 0.0869  0.0857  0.0849  0.0856  
Other manuf. industries 0.0655  0.0662  0.0654  0.0657  
Traditional services 0.1675  0.1691  0.1690  0.1679  
Services for the firms 0.2600  0.2618  0.2610  0.2614  
Social Services 0.2577  0.2555  0.2587  0.2590  
Personal services 0.0200  0.0200  0.0199  0.0200  
Sanitation services 0.0146  0.0150  0.0149  0.0151  
Coll.Agr.Firm Level 0.3777  0.3702  0.3697  0.3677  
N observations 25070  24220  24409  24419  
S.E. (Standard Errors) are only included for continuous variables. 
IC: Initial Conditions 
Source: ECL 1993Q1-2002Q1 
 
